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19 Theory, application and the 
canon 
The case of Mill and J evons 
Sandra Peart 
Boundary questions, it has been well said, are always perplexing. 
(Economist 1882: 845) 
Introduction 
Whatever disputes remain about the nature and content of the "canon" of 
economics, it is widely accepted that the boundary of economic science was 
narrowed throughout the nineteenth century (Winch 1972). This chapter 
offers a partial explanation for that narrowing in the methodological develop-
ments that occurred during the second half of the century. For reasons of 
practicality in the face of pronounced "multiplicity of cause," John Stuart Mill 
called, ~n his 1836 Essay On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method 
of Investigation Proper to It, and again in his 1843 Logi,c, for a separate and 
specialized science of political economy. The problem of multiple cause 
implied that the science should be substantially deductive in nature. Yet Mill 
accorded a role to induction, in the establishment of the basic causal 
framework, and to the process of verifying the accuracy of the theoretical 
analysis. Revision of the theory in the light of such verification established a key 
link between theory, and application. 
In the 1870s this method was strenuously resisted by the British Historicists, 
notably John Kells Ingram and T. E. Cliffe Leslie.I Contemporary critics of 
economic method feared that the deductive method, abstracting as it did from 
the full array of causes that influenced economic phenomena, would lead to 
unjustifiable neglect of relevant causes. By contrast, Ingram and Leslie called 
for empirical studies, upon which they envisaged the theory of economics (and 
the broader sociological study they favored) could be constructed. 
William Stanley Jevons's response to the critics of economic method served 
to narrow the canon while at the same time yielding a place for empirical 
studies within the discipline. He called for subdivision within economics, along 
both subject matter and methodological lines (Black 1972, Peart 1996). He 
defended the substantially deductive method outlined by Mill for economic 
theory, and then called for "subdivision" of the discipline as a remedy to its 
"chaotic" state. Historical studies would, consequently, become a specialization 
within the discipline alongside "empirical," "applied," and "theoretical" 
studies. As such, the historical and empirical study of economics would not 
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supplant but would instead complement the theoretical basis for the discipline. 
Jevons never clearly spelled out the relationships among the separate special-
izations of economics, yet two features of his calls for subdivision will become 
clear. First, the role of historical and empirical study is said to be limited to veri-
fying the truth of the theory in widely different settings. Second, an implicit 
hierarchy was envisaged, in which theory, with its mathematical precision, 
logical consistency and universally relevant status, is granted an elevated status, 
above applications. 
Such calls for increased subdivision served, perhaps unwittingly, to insulate 
theory- a theory now said to be universally applicable - from evidence, and to 
facilitate the development of empirical studies that were not necessarily well 
linked to theory. For a mechanism was furnished whereby the theory was sepa-
rated from application, and while the theory was presumed invariant to time 
and space, variations were presumed to occur in application. Most significantly, 
what such variation implies for theory is never spelled out. However, if the 
canon as it is usually defined consists of theoretical principles that are central 
to the discipline, then questionable, refuted or otherwise doubtful principles 
can be relegated to subdivisions - to what J evons called "applied" or "historical" 
economics - and do not call the canon itself into question. 
Mill's case for specialization 
' 
The debate on method of the late nineteenth century was intimately linked 
with that on Ireland, in which Mill was an active participant.2 The Irish 
question in fact constituted a catalyst for the issue of whether the axioms of 
political economy might be considered universally relevant, or of limited 
temporal and spatial applicability. Mill's proposal for widespread land reform 
in Ireland and his review essay, Leslie and the Land Question, are methodolog-
ically revealing. For his position, like that of the historicists, is that institutional 
and cultural differences in Ireland may render the conclusions of political 
economy invalid there: Mill was keenly aware of the limited relevance of 
conclusions developed in the context of the English institutional and cultural 
arrangements. It is no coincidence that while Jevons rarely objects to Mill's 
policy recommendations, Ireland constitutes one instance where he finds 
Mill's position - advocating broad land reform - questionable.3 Jevons wrote 
little directly on Ireland. His objections to Mill's reform proposals appear in an 
1880 Contemp(ffary Review article, "Experimental Legislation and the Drink 
Traffic," where he argued that Mill's reform proposal was too wide-ranging. In 
its stead, Jevons favored peasant proprietorship on a small - and presumably 
voluntary- scale (Jevons 1882: 274). Here, as in his Theory of Political Economy, 
he thus moved ever so slightly towards removing economic analysis from 
institutional concerns. 
Perhaps more than any economist of his time or since, Mill was a synthesizer. 
However, for reasons of practicality in the face of multiple causation, he called 
for specialization in the social sciences. The argument for specialization 
presumed that to discover how humans behave under the influence of all 
circumstances, one should first isolate causes and study the resulting effects 
separately. This is precisely the argument thatJevons was later to use. Both also 
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presumed that the process was generally additive, and thus that the separate 
effects of causes, once known, could be added to yield a total. 
Mill maintained that economists faced great difficulties as a result of the 
"'composition of causes" that characterizes the phenomena they study. Since 
"every attribute of the social body is influenced by innumerable causes," social 
phenomena, for Mill, were characterized by a pronounced multiplicity of cause: 
the phenomena of society do not depend, in essentials, on some one 
agency or law of human nature, with only inconsiderable modifications 
from others. The whole of the qualities of human nature influence those 
phenomena, and there is not one, the removal or any great alteration of 
which would not materially affect the whole aspect of society, and change 
more or less the sequences of social phenomena generally. 
(Mill (1843) 1973, vol. 8: 894) 
Recognition of this problem underscores all of Mill's writing on method. 
Two major implications resulted from this preoccupation. First, in the face of 
such complexity, Mill argued strongly in favor of a deductive method modeled 
after physics, that compounds the effects of various causes considered sepa-
rately: 
The Social Science, therefore (which, by a convenient barbarism, has been 
termed Sociology), is a deductive science; not, indeed, after the model of 
geometry, but after that of the more complex physical sciences. It infers 
the law of each effect from the laws of causation on which that effect 
deperids; not, however, from the law merely of one cause, as in the geomet-
rical method, but by considering all the causes which conjl,lnctly influence 
the effect, and compounding their laws with one another. Its method, in 
short, is the Concrete Deductive Method: that of which astronomy 
furnishes the most perfect, natural philosophy a somewhat less perfect, 
example, and the employment of which, with the adaptations and precau-
tions required by the subject, is beginning to regenerate physiology. 
(Mill [1843] 1973, vol. 8: 895) 
Multiplicity of cause implied that induction was insufficient to establish 
causality: "the causes on which any class of phenomena depend are so imper-
fectly accessible to our observation that we cannot ascertain, by a proper 
induction, their numerical laws" (ibid., vol. 7: 620). Because possibilities for 
experimentation were so limited, and since theoretical specification of effects 
in the face of pronounced multiple cause was impossible, using the "laws of 
quantity" to "calculate forward to an effect," (whatjevons would call "inductive 
quantification"), was inappropriate in social science (ibid., vol. 7: 620-1). (For 
a demonstration of the difference betweenjevons and Mill in this respect, see 
Peart 1993.) In such instances: 
specific experience affords nothing amounting to empirical laws. This is 
particularly the case where the object is to determine the effect of any one 
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social cause among a great number acting simultaneously; the effect, for 
example of corn laws, or of a prohibitive commercial system generally. 
(Mill [1843) 1973, vol. 8: 908; cf. vol. 4: 332)4 
Such complications meant that great caution was in order. Yet while limited 
experimental possibilities rendered it impossible to infer laws of causation 
through .observation, the basic causal structure was accessible through obser-
vation and introspection (Mill [1836) 1967, vol. 4: 329; Hausman 1992). 
Second, and perhaps more importantly given the theme of this chapter, the 
complexity of economic phenomena rendered it impossible to specify all the 
causal factors at work in all cases. Consequently, Mill urged that scientists select 
the main (or "general") causes in action, and reason based on those selections. 
This formed the methodological basis for limited specialization within social 
science: 
By reasoning from that one law of human nature, and from the principal 
outward circumstances (whether universal or confined to particular states 
of society) which operate upon the human mind through that law, we may 
be enabled to explain and predict this portion of the phenomena of 
society, so far as they depend on that class of circumstances only .... A 
department of science may thus be constructed which has received the 
name of Political Economy. 
(Mill [1843) 1973, vol. 8: 901) 
The outcome of such a procedure is "hypothetical," correct only to the 
extent that no additional causes interfere with it: 
All the general propositions which can be framed by the deductive science, 
are therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, hypothetical. They are 
grounded on some suppositious set of circumstances, and declare how 
· some given cause would operate in those circumstances, supposing that no 
others were combined with them. If the set of circumstances supposed 
have been copied from those of any existing society, the conclusions will be 
true of that society, provided, and in as far as, the effect of those circum-
stances shall not be modified by others which have not been taken into 
account. 
(Mill [1843) 1973, vol. 8: 900)5 
In his 1836 Essay, Mill's language was somewhat stronger in pointing to the 
hypothetical character of economic reasoning: political economy, he writes 
there, 
does not treat of the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state, 
nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely 
as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of 
the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only 
such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of 
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the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other human 
passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually 
antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, 
and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences. 
(Mill [1836] 1967, vol. 4: 321) 
Thus, in this context Mill argued that one abstracts from the multitude of 
desires and motivations that prompt a being to act in a social context, and 
reasons based on the premise that economic actions are mainly influenced by 
self-interest. 6 
Recognition of the inadequate causal basis of analysis necessarily meant that 
such reasoning was based on an explicitly-recognized incomplete set of causes: 
economists' deductive conclusions were derived from a set of causes that 
abstracted from, (or held constant), additional causes known to affect the 
phenomena in question. The resulting reasoning would therefore provide an 
adequate representation of reality only if all of the general causes influencing 
the phenomena have been taken into account by the theorist (ibid.: 329; see 
Hausman 1992). Even in these circumstances, however, partial or disturbing 
causes were bound also to influence the phenomena on occasion, so that the 
conclusions of the theory were never borne out completely by observation. As a 
consequence of this recognition, Mill insisted on an additional methodological 
step, of verification. The deductive conclusions of political economy, he urged, 
were to be checked constantly against specific experience. The importance o~ 
combining the a priori method with verification increased as the "composition 
of causes" became more pronounced; "[a]t every step," Mill urged scientists 
to assure ourselves that no other law of nature has superseded, or inter-
mingled its operation with, those which are the premises of the reasoning; 
and how can this be done by merely looking at the words? We must not 
only be constantly thinking of the phenomena themselves, but we must be 
constantly studying them; making ourselves acquainted with the peculiar-
ities of every case to which we attempt to apply our general principles. 
(Mill [1843] 1973, vol. 7: 710) 
Verification was the means to assessing the effects of"partial" or "disturbing" 
causes, which, once determined, might be added to or subtracted from the 
effects of general causes (Mill [1836] 1967, vol. 4: 330). Disturbing causes 
(which "have their laws, as the causes which are thereby disturbed have theirs") 
might be "brought within the pale of the abstract science if it were worthwhile" 
(ibid.: 331), "inserting among its hypotheses a fresh and still more complex 
combination of circumstances, and so adding pro hdc vice a supplementary 
chapter or appendix, or at least a supplementary theory, to the abstract 
science" (ibid.). However the role of verification was not limited to this; it 
might also reveal 
errors in thought, still more serious than what can with any propriety be 
termed a disturbing cause. It often reveals to us that the basis itself of our 
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whole argument is insufficient; that the data, from which we had reasoned, 
comprise only a part, and not always the most important part, of the 
circumstances by which the result is really determined. 
(Mill [1836) 1967, vol. 4: 332) 
Two types of revisions of the theory thus result from the process of verifi-
cation. A set of general causes, A, B, and C is used to predict the outcome E. 
E* is observed, leading the scientist to revise the causal framework by adding 
D to the model. Alternatively, the procedure of verification might reveal that 
the axioms have been inferred from an incomplete set of circumstances. In this 
instance observation ofE* leads the scientist to revise A, Band C to A*, B* and 
C* (Peart 1993). Mill never clarified, however, how one is to distinguish 
between these two problems. 
A key consequence of the recognized inadequacy of the reasoning was the 
limited predictive capacity of the science: 
Sociology, considered as a system of deductions a priori, can not be a 
science of positive predictions, but only of tendencies. We may be able to 
conclude, from the laws of human nature applied to the circumstances of 
a given state of society, that a particular cause will operate in a certain 
manner unless counteracted; but we can never be assured to what extent 
or amount it will so operate, or affirm with certainty that it will not be coun-
teracted; because we can seldom know, even approximately, all the 
agencies which may co-exist with it, and still less calculate the collective 
result of so many combined elements. 
(Mill [1843) 1973, vol. 8: 898)7 
The conclusions of political economy were consequently of limited rele-
vance, either because they were true only to the extent that additional causes 
did not interfere with those specified in the reasoning, or because additional 
causes whose effects were presumed constant had in fact varied.8 
The significance of Mill's emphasis on verification for the theory-practice 
distinction (and the nature and flexibility of the canon of economics), is that 
it provides a loosely-defined but nonetheless significant mechanism whereby 
the basic causal structure can be modified, as a result of close empirical 
scrutiny, in order better to describe "real world" phenomena. One telling 
instance of such modification involves the basic self-interest motivation.9 Here 
Mill altered the theoretical model in order to incorporate the influence of 
"custom." The analysis entails an attempt to account theoretically for observa-
tions of contemporary market structures. It is a matter of circumstance how 
custom is to be classified; in some instances the influence of custom is so strong 
and pervasive that it must be treated as the general cause, relegating to compe-
tition the role of disturbance: 
hitherto it is only in the great centres of business that retail transactions 
have been chiefly, or even much, determined, by competition. Elsewhere 
it rather acts, when it acts at all, as an occasional disturbing influence; the 
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habitual regulator is custom, modified from time to time by notions 
existing in the minds of purchasers and sellers, of some kind of equity or 
justice. 
(Mill [1836] 1967, vol. 4: 243) 
Methodological challenges 
In the latter half of the century, and especially during the 1870s, several 
attacks on the nature and scope of Economics were mounted by, among 
others, ]. K. Ingram, and Cliffe Leslie.IO These attacks focused first and 
foremost on the relative roles of induction and deduction in economics, and 
on the legitimacy of studying economic phenomena separately from social 
phenomena.II So successful were they that in 1876 Sir Francis Gaitan 
attempted to have economics removed from Section F of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, and the following year the 
Adam Smith Centennial Dinner of the Political Economy Club broke into an 
acrimonious discussion of the nature of economics. Following the dinner, the 
Pall Mall Gazette reported that "the natural philosophers have been 
frightened out of their wits by the ladies who flock to the Section of 
'Economic Science and Statistics' and who insist on reading papers and 
starting discussions which are not only not scientific but which savour of the 
singular antipathy to science for its own sake common to all the feminine 
movements of the day" (Jevons 1972-81, vol. 4: 272-3). 
Ingram's Presidential Address to Section F (Economic Science and 
Statistics) of the British Association at the 1878 Dublin meeting consisted of 
"an exhaustive argument in vindication of the right of Political Economy and 
Statistics to citizenship in the commonwealth of science" (The Times, August 17 
1878, p. 10). Relying squarely on the authority of Comte (whose influence on 
Ingram is very strong), Mill and Spencer, Ingram defended the scientific status 
of the study of "economic facts." But the question that followed was in what 
sense economics was scientific. Ingram strongly objected to the method advo-
cated by Mill, which attempted to specify a limited set of causal factors and 
study them in depth: 
the pretension of the economist to isolate the special phenomena they 
study, the economic phenomena of society, from all the rest - its material 
aspect from its intellectual, moral, and political aspects, and to constitute 
an independent science, dealing with the former alone, to the exclusion of 
the latter. 
(Ingram 1878: 608) 
In opposition to that procedure, Ingram urged that the mutual relationship 
between economics and "the general body of human knowledge" constituted 
"the most radical and vital" question of economic studies, one on which the 
future of political economy depended (ibid.).12 
Ingram reiterated these arguments in his popular textbook, History of 
Political Economy. "Economics must be constantly regarded as forming only one 
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department of the larger science of Sociology, in vital connection with its 
other departments, and with the moral synthesis which is the crown of the 
whole intellectual system" (Ingram [1888] 1967: 296). Social phenomena, he 
argued there, were not independent one from another as was commonly 
presumed, but were instead mutually determining. As a result, isolated 
consideration of one set of causes necessarily neglected key determining 
influences; most importantly, also, such procedures neglected the "high 
moral issues" to which, Ingram contended, political economy is "subservient" 
(ibid.: 297). 
Ingram allowed that, for Mill, the method of political economy entailed a 
key role for verification. Yet Mill is said to "halt" between the correct method 
of the scientific study of sociological phenomena - the method revealed to 
him by Comte - a posteriori, and the deductive method of "his youth" (Ingram 
[1888] 1967: 150). Ingram was consequently critical of Mill's reliance on 
abstraction: Mill's hypothetical "economic man" comes in for particularly 
harsh criticism as an unrealistic and thus unscientific construct (ibid.: 
151-2). Cairnes receives harsh criticism as well; his logical method of 
political economy is said to constitute "a retrogression in methodology" 
because, unlike Mill, Cairnes concludes that verification is unnecessary in 
political economy (ibid.: 150-1). Ingram attributes the "larger and more 
philosophical spirit in which Mill dealt with social subjects" to the influence 
of Comte (ibid.: 146). 
In a series of articles written in the 1870s, the Irish political economist, 
qiffe Leslie similarly challenged the claim to distinctness by political 
economy, and argued in favor of developing a historical method: 
The truth is, that the whole economy of every nation, as regards the occu-
pations and pursuits of both sexes, the nature, amount, distribution and 
consumption of wealth, is the result of a long evolution in which there has 
been both continuity and change, and of which the economical side is only 
a particular aspect or phase. And the laws of which it is the result must be 
sought in history and the general laws of society and social evolution. 
(Leslie 1876: 227) 15 
Little had been accomplished, however, in the discovery of such laws of 
evolution, and Leslie warned that such important work would soon be taken 
over by sociologists, if political economists continued their neglect (ibid.: 
241). He blamed political economists - and particularly the formalization of 
economic theory - for such lack of progress: "The bane of political economy 
has been the haste of its students to possess themselves of a complete and 
symmetrical system, solving all the problems before it with mathematical 
certainty and exactness" (ibid.: 241). 
Leslie's criticism focused on what he regarded as overly abstract methods 
used by political economists. He allowed that Mill possessed some historical 
sensibilities, but argued that Mill's training in the Ricardian school and 
methods caused him to neglect or suppress such sensibilities (ibid.: 221). 
Consequently, Millian-style analysis overly simplified the causal structure 
underlying economic phenomena: 
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The real defect of the treatment by economists of these other principles is, 
that it is superficial and unphilosophical; that no attempt has been made 
even to enumerate them adequately, much less to measure their relative 
force in different states of society; and that they are employed simply to 
prop up rude generalizations for which the authority of 'laws' is claimed. 
They serve, along with other conditions, to give some sort of support to 
saving clauses, - such as 'allowing for differences in the nature of different 
employments,' 'caeteris paribus,' 'in the absence of disturbing causes,' 
'making allowance for friction' - by which the 'law' that wages and profits 
tend to equality eludes scrutiny. Had the actual operation of the motives in 
question been investigated, it would have been seen to vary widely in 
different states of society, and under different conditions. 
(Leslie 1876: 226) 
In opposition to Mill (and, as we will see later, to Jevons) Leslie tended to 
focus on just those causes the economists downplayed: 
Had Mr. Mill looked to actual life, he must have at once perceived that 
among the strongest desires confounded in the abstract 'desire for wealth,' 
are desires for the present enjoyment of luxuries; and that the aversion to 
labour itself has been one of the principal causes of inventions and 
improvements which abridge it. 
(Leslie 1876: 225) 
In fairness to both Leslie and Mill, however, one might note that Leslie's criti-
cisms were generally aimed not so much at Mill as at the simplistic and narrow 
so-called "followers" of classical economists' methods. In particular, politicians 
who based poorly designed policy measures loosely on arguments of classical 
economists, come in for harsh criticism. 
Like Ingram, Leslie was also critical of calls for the development of a 
separate science of political economy. He allowed that the science might select 
a "special class of social phenomena for special investigation," but he insisted 
that it must nonetheless "investigate all the forces and laws by which they are 
governed" (Leslie 1879a: 404). 
Leslie also objected to any claim that the maximization axiom was univer-
sally relevant: 
Mr.Jevons, though favourably disposed by philosophical culture and tastes 
towards historical investigation in economics, has urged on behalf of 
deduction from the acquisitive principle, that even the lower animals act 
from a similar motive. 
(Leslie 1879a: 389) 
While the limited capacity of the human mind rendered the pragmatic 
separate study of economic phenomena a necessary evil, Leslie cautioned 
against paying insufficient attention to "all the causes" affecting such 
phenomena. Thus, he argued, 
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it is legitimate to make economic phenomena, the division of labour, the 
nature, amount, and distribution of national riches, the subject of 
particular examination; provided that all the causes affecting them be 
taken into account. To isolate a single force, even if a real force and not a 
mere abstraction, and to call deductions from it alone the laws of wealth, 
can lead only to error, and is radically unscientific 
(Leslie 1879a: 404) 
The problem was all the more serious because economists "more often still 
havejtimped to the laws without heed to the phenomena" (ibid.: 378). 
In contrast to the substantially deductive method of political economists, 
Leslie urged that a combination of methods be used in economics.13 
Specifically, he advocated the "formal incorporation of economic science with 
statistics," a combination which would tend to correct the tendency of one-
sided reliance on theory on the part of economists, and on facts, on the part 
of statisticians (Leslie 1873a: 377; cf. 378). 
In a telling indictment of the state of political economy late in the decade, 
the Oxford professor Bonamy Price questioned the limited achievements of 
the discipline as well as its very scientific nature (Price 1879: 182).14 Price 
objected to the treatment of political economy as an exact science, a treatment 
encouraged by Ricardo (though Price suggested that Ricardo did not actually 
regard economics as an exact science) and, to some extent, J. S. Mill (ibid.: 
198). In the case of Mill, however, Price argued that 
His whole temper and disposition rendered him incapable of being 
restrained by bounds inapplicable to the subject, even when they had been 
prescribed by himself. Consequently, throughout his whole work, he boldly 
deserts, whenever it suits him, the endeavour to write scientifically; and the 
best parts of his work are when he does so 
(Price 1879: 198)15 
It is, in fact, this attention to detail as well as the fuzzy boundary to the subject 
matter that Price admired in Mill, and the lack of which he objected to in 
Jevons (ibid.: 200-1). 
Jevons's response to the challenge 
Jevons's defense of economics in the face of such challenges was spelled out in 
an 1876 lecture delivered at University College, "The Future of Political 
Economy," as well as the 1879 'Preface' and 'Introduction' to his Theory of 
Political Economy. Having recognized in the lecture that "the state of the 
science" was "almost chaotic" (Jevons [1905] 1965: 191), his response to the 
critics was two-sided. First,Jevons called for further subdivision within the disci-
pline, now in fact proceeding a step beyond Mill, advocating a permanent 
separation of economic from sociological studies, and subdivided "historical," 
"empirical," "theoretical," and "concrete," or applied, studies within 
economics. For the theoretical study of economics, Jevons's methodological 
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recommendation was very much in line with that of Mill. Where he differed 
from Mill was in his insistence on further specialization within the discipline. 
In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, Jevons also favored the use of 
statistical methods in economics, and he conducted some pioneering statistical 
studies himself. Not surprisingly, this won him some support from the 
dissenters above, most notably .Cliffe Leslie. Leslie remained troubled, 
however, by Jevons's inattention to the full potential array of causal factors 
influencing the specific phenomena under investigation. 
In his 1876 lecture, Jevons recognized the "absolutely essential" nature of 
the type of historically based empirical study advocated by Leslie (Jevons 
[1905] 1965: 196). Yet he held fast, in opposition to Leslie and other 
Historicists, to the argument that historical studies would neither "destroy" nor 
"replace" "abstract theory." He opposed the historicists' argument outlined 
earlier concerning the limited relevance of the conclusions of political 
economy, arguing instead that the laws of political economy - including the 
"most fundamental" law "that human wants are limited in extent" - "are so 
simple in their foundation that they would apply, more or less completely, to 
all human beings of whom we have any knowledge" (ibid.: 196). Jevons 
concluded, "They seem to be in a very rudimentary state among the Eskimo . 
. . . Nevertheless we can trace in [the] transaction of the borrowed boat the 
simple principles which are at the basis of economy" (ibid.: 196), and he spec-
ulated that "I should not despair of tracing the action of the postulates of 
political economy among some of the more intelligent classes of animals. Dogs 
certainly have strong though perhaps limited ideas of property" (ibid.: 197). 
As a consequence of his conviction that "the first principles of political 
economy are so widely true and applicable that they may be considered univer-
sally true as regards human nature," Jevons argued that the role of historical 
political economy would necessarily be limited to "exhibiting" and "verifying" 
the "long-continued action of its laws in most widely different states of society" 
(ibid.: 197).16 In sharp contrast with the historicists, then, Jevons carved a 
specialization within economics (theory) in which individual - rather than 
social- phenomena were placed squarely at the centre of the analysis.17 
However,Jevons allowed that Leslie's calls for historical studies of economic 
phenomena should not go unheeded. He called for subdivision within the 
discipline, and argued that historical studies should constitute one of the 
subdivisions within the discipline. "The fact is," Jevons maintained, "it will no 
longer be possible to treat political economy as if it were a single undivided and 
indivisible science."18 He enumerated several ways in which such subdivision 
should occur - along both the lines of subject matter, as well as methods. Thus, 
he argued first: 
There is, firstly, the old distinction of the laws of the science, according as 
they treat of the production, exchange, distribution, or consumption of 
wealth. In this respect economy may be regarded as an aggregate of two or 
more different sciences, there being, in fact, little connection between the 
principles which should guide us in production and those which apply in 
distribution or consumption. 
(Jevons [1905] 1965: 197-8) 
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In addition, a division should occur according to whether the subject matter 
were theoretical, or applied.19 Here,Jevons insisted again on the "generality" 
of the theoretical laws, while allowing that variation might occur in the 
"concrete" applications: 
Passing now to a second aspect, political economy will naturally be divided 
according as it is abstract or concrete. The theory of the science consists of 
those general laws which are so simple in nature, and so deeply grounded 
in the constitution of man and the outer world, that they remain the same 
throughout all those ages which are within our consideration. But though 
the laws are the same they may receive widely different applications in the 
concrete. The primary laws of motion are the same, whether they be 
applied to solids, liquids, or gases, though the phenomena obeying those 
laws are apparently so different. Just as there is a general science of 
mechanics, so we must have a general science or theory of economy. 
(Jevons [1905] 1965: 198) 
But Jevons went farther. He called next for subdivisions of "concrete 
political economy" along the lines of newly constituted subject matter: 
Concrete political economy, however, can hardly be called one science, but 
already consists of many extensive branches of inquiry. Currency, banking, 
the relations of labour and capital, those of landlord and tenant, 
pauperism, taxation, and finance, are some of the principal portions of 
applied political economy, all involving the same ultimate laws manifested 
in most different circumstances. In a subject of such appalling extent and 
complexity as currency, for instance, we depend upon the laws of supply 
and demand, of consumption and production of commodities as applied 
to the precious metals or other materials of money. In the science of 
banking and the money market we have a very difficult application of the 
same laws to capital in general. This separation of the concrete branches 
of the science is, however, sufficiently obvious and recognised, and I need 
not dwell further on it. The general conclusion, then, to which I come is 
that political economy must for the future be looked upon as an aggregate 
of sciences. 
(Jevons [1905] 1965: 200; cf. 206)20 
In the future, and in contrast with Mill, Jevons envisaged the growth but not 
the synthesis of such sciences (ibid.: 206). As Steedman has argued in a 
different context, the theory/practice distinction does not in and of itself 
imply preeminence of the logical core over application (Steedman 1998: 17). 
It does seem, however, that inJevons's mind there was a presumed hierarchy, 
theory, with its generality and logical consistency, being regarded as superior to 
"application." 
Jevons's Theory of Political Economy contained his other major strong plea for 
subdivision. In this context he alluded to the "remarkable discussion [that] has 
been lately going on in the reviews and journals concerning the logical method 
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of the science, touching even the question whether there exists any such 
science at all" (Jevons [1871] 1911: xv). He recognized "a spirit of very active 
criticism," especially in Leslie's Hermathena article, which attempted to "to 
dissipate altogether the deductive science of Ricardo" (ibid.: xvi).21 Again he 
urged that the "present chaotic state of Economics arises from the confusing 
together of several branches of knowledge" (ibid.: xvi-vii), a problem to be 
remedied by subdivision: 
Subdivision is the remedy. We must distinguish the empirical element from 
the abstract theory, from the applied theory, and from the more detailed art 
of finance and administration. Thus will arise various sciences, such as 
commercial statistics, the mathematical theory of economics, systematic 
and descriptive economics, economic sociology, and fiscal science. There 
may even be a kind of cross subdivision of the sciences; that is to say, there 
will be division into branches as regards the subject, and division according 
to the manner of treating the branch of the subject. The manner may be 
theoretical, empirical, historical, or practical; the subject may be capital and 
labour, currency, banking, taxation, land tenure, etc. - not to speak of the 
more fundamental division of the science as it treats of consumption, 
production, exchange, and distribution of wealth. In fact, the whole subject 
is so extensive, intricate, and diverse, that it is absurd to suppose it can be 
treated in any single book or in any single manner. It is no more one science 
than statistics, dynamics, the theory of heat, optics, magnetoelectricity, 
telegraphy, navigation, and photographic chemistry are one science. 
(Jevons [1871] 1911: xvii) 
Jevons reiterated the case for the universal status of theory: 
But as all the physical sciences have their basis more or less obviously in the 
general principles of mechanics, so all branches and divisions of economic 
science must be pervaded by certain general principles. It is to the investi-
gation of such principles - to the tracing out of the mechanics of 
self-interest and utility- that this essay has been devoted". 
(Jevons [1871] 1911: xvii-xviii) 
The theory of political economy, the "logical method" propounded here by 
Jevons - in opposition to the calls for increased inductive content put forth by 
Leslie and others -was that advocated by Mill (as well as Caimes): 
[Mill] considers that we may start from some obvious psychological law, as 
for instance, that a greater gain is preferred to a smaller one, and we may 
then reason downwards, and predict the phenomena which will be 
produced in society by such a law. The causes in action in any community 
are, indeed, so complicated that we shall seldom be able to discover the 
undisturbed effects of any one law, but, so far as we can analyse the statis-
tical phenomena observed, we obtain a verification of our reasoning. 
(Jevons [1871] 1911: 16-17) 
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In contrast with Mill,Jevons called this the "Complete Method," as "implying 
that it combines observation, deduction, and induction in the most complete 
and perfect way ... induction itself in its essential form": 
Possessing certain facts of observation, we frame an hypothesis as to the 
laws governing those facts; we reason from the hypothesis deductively to 
the results to be expected; and we then examine these results in 
connection with the facts in question; coincidence confirms the whole 
reasoning; conflict obliges us either to seek for disturbing causes, or else to 
abandon our hypothesis. 
(Jevons [1871] 1911: 17-18) • 
While Jevons concurred with Leslie and Ingram "so far as to allow that 
historical investigation is of great importance in Social Science," he reiterated 
his argument that "instead of converting our present science of economics into 
an historical science, utterly destroying it in the process," he would "perfect 
and develop" theoretical economics, while "at the same time" erecting "a new 
branch of social science on an historical foundation" (ibid.: 20).22 
Jevons's own career very much followed the prescription for subdivision. 
While he refrained from complementing his theoretical treatment with 
empirical methods in the Theory, he called there for the collection of 
improved economic data on consumption (Jevons [1871] 1911: 10-11). 
Further, while alluding to the difficulties involved, he called for comple-
mentary statistical endeavors in order to invest theory with the "reality and 
life of fact" (ibid.: 22; cf. 1905: 195). He was, and remains, well known as an 
applied, as well as a theoretical, economist.23 
Most importantly, perhaps, Jevons contributed significant empirical 
studies throughout his career, contributions that were well known and 
granted at least qualified approbation by Leslie, Ingram, and other econo-
mists of his day. In fact, in correspondence with Jevons, Leon Walras 
remarked that he knew Jevons's reputation as an applied statistician rather 
than a theorist (May 23 1874;Jevons 1972-81, vol. 4: 45).Jevons's work on 
the value of gold attracted wide attention in the 1860s and well into this 
century; as a consequence Irving Fisher concluded that Jevons was the 
"father of index numbers" (Fisher 1922: 459). Keynes praised J evons's ability 
in this regard to "survey his material with the prying eyes and fertile, 
controlled imagination of the natural scientist" (Keynes 1951: 268).Jevons's 
attempts to decompose time series into secular and cyclical components also 
earned him high praise (Mitchell 1928: 384) and the title "founder of econo-
metric method" (Robertson 1951: 247).24 
Injevons's "reconstruction" of political economy, he made one important 
additional step, one that Mill would never sanction and which greatly troubled 
Leslie. In such applications as the gold studies,Jevons argued that causes other 
than the gold influx "balanced" in the drawing of a mean, and thus could be 
neglected at least in 'large enough' samples (Peart 1995). Though he was very 
much in favor of such empirical studies, Leslie - true to his concerns outlined 
earlier - criticized the method of averages used by Jevons in the gold studies. 
In a paper that argued strongly in favor of uniting economics and statistics, 
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•Leslie presented a general criticism of the assumption that, in application, one 
might ignore omitted causes, or presume they "balance": 
And we have in this matter an illustration of the defective character of that 
kind of statistical inquiry which confines itself to the collection of a 
multitude of instances of facts, without reference to causes. It must be 
allowed that the principles laid down by the illustrious Quetelet rather tend 
to foster the error to which we advert. He assumed that by enlarging the 
number of instances, we eliminate chance and arrive at general and stable 
laws of conditions. But a great number of instances does not give us their 
law, or justify us in any positive conclusion respecting the future. New condi-
tions, for example, have been acting on prices during the last two years, and 
mere tables of prices for the last twenty or ten years, confound years in 
which those causes were in operation with years in which they were not. 
(Leslie 1873a: 381) 
Thus, Leslie was critical of what he took asjevons's inadequate attention to 
the full array of causal factors influencing price data. In opposition to Jevons 
he stressed that the gold discoveries were not the only cause of the measured 
price alteration: the method of averages, he contended, 
does not show the real movement of prices or the real depreciation of 
money; the tables omit some of the chief elements of the cost ofliving; the 
prices compared are wholesale prices, while the purchasing power of an 
income depends on retail prices; and, by ascribing the whole rise of prices 
to the new gold, this method conceals the material fact that the gold is only 
one of a plurality of causes lately tending to raise them 
(Leslie 1873b: 349) 
Leslie questionedjevons's assumption that "the new gold [constitutes] the sole 
cause of the rise in prices arrived at, on the ground that the 'average must, in 
all reasonable probability, represent some single influence acting on all 
commodities,"' and argued, in opposition to Jevons, "But why not a plurality of 
influences?" (ibid.: 353). Leslie's own investigation focused on this very 
"plurality of causes," and how their influences differed across different prices: 
"The actual situation of matters in England is, then, that a number of causes, 
of which the new gold is only one, have raised the cost ofliving" (ibid.: 355). 
Conclusions: implications of the calls for subdivision 
These were complex disputes, complicated by Irish policy issues, views on 
Ricardian distribution theory, and gray areas where the major contributors 
shared common ground. Neither Mill norjevons entirely opposed the histori-
cally-based treatment of economic phenomena propounded by Ingram and 
Leslie. The Historicists' sharpest criticisms were often directed at naive or 
narrow economic analysis relied upon by politicians who proclaimed economic 
theory widely transferable (to Ireland, in particular). Still, the foregoing 
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suggests that economics moved, withjevons pushing it, a step away from Mill 
and perhaps two away from the Historicists by the end of the 1870s. 
Subdivision, with economic theory placed in a position superior to application 
and few clearly spelled out connections among specialties, reversed the scien-
tific order envisaged by]. K Ingram and Cliffe Leslie. 
It would, of course, be unwise to attribute the development of the 
economics canon following Jevons's death in 1882, to his contributions to 
these methodological debates. And it would be simplistic to suggest thatjevons 
alone is responsible for narrowing the economics canon late in the century, or 
that the methodology debates occurred without reference to policy issues 
which were in fact of great significance, especially to Mill, Ingram and Leslie. 
The Irish question formed a backdrop to these methodological debates 
throughout the decade, and issues of whether the axioms of political economy 
were universally relevant or whether economic behavior could be studied in 
abstraction from the institutional (and, as they often put it) "moral" aspects of 
the economy, were often framed in terms of the Irish question (Koot 1975). 
Certainly also, as outlined earlier, Jevons's own example was by no means 
narrow.25 In addition, although there is enough evidence to suggest thatjevons 
influenced these debates and helped to silence the critics of economics, it 
would be fo$)lhardy not to recognize two later contributions: by]. M. Keynes, 
and by Alfred Marshall. But it would be equally foolhardy to neglect, as many 
have,Jevons's influence on the debate and to conclude that it was Keynes and 
Marshall alone who caused the demise of Historicism in England. 
Whatever the effect ofjevons's methodological recommendations, there is 
no evidence that he made them strategically, in order to counter the 
Historicists' influence. Instead, it is much more likely that J evons called for 
subdivision because he genuinely believed this was the fruitful methodological 
approach for the future of his discipline. 
It does bear noting, however, that Jevons made something of a virtue of 
disconnectedness. To some, Jevons's position on the methodology of 
economics appears rather unfinished. Unlike Mill's Logic, there is no section in 
his 1874 Principl,es of Science on the methodology of social science. Jevons never 
related the methodological recommendations in the 1876 lecture or the 1879 
edition of his Theory to his Principks of Science. Some have surmised that he 
might have eventually tried to relate apparently disconnected portions of his 
work (see the Guardian, September 1 1886: 'Review of Letters and journal, p. 
1282; Jevons Archive 6/50/20). Others, like Keynes (1951), have concluded 
thatjevons's best work was finished at the time of his death. 
Even beyond the Historicists' concerns, then, there is evidence thatjevons's 
contemporaries were troubled by his calls for separation of theory and 
practice, and the resulting disconnected nature ofjevons's work.]. E. Caimes, 
for instance, found Jevons's inattention to practice troubling. His distrust of 
the theory-practice distinction explains, in part, why Caimes objected to the 
formalization of economic theory injevons: 
When mathematics are carried further than this ["very limited appli-
cation"] in the moral or social sciences, and used for conducting processes 
of reasoning, without constant reference to the concrete meaning of the 
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terms for which the mathematical symbols are employed, I own I regard 
the practice with profound distrust. 
(Cairnes 1872: 76) 
Contemporary summaries ofJevons's achievements also focused on his calls 
for the separation of theory and practice. Philip Wicksteed's (very favorable) 
review of the posthumously published Letters and journal suggested that one 
of Jevons's major achievements lay in his having provided social scientists 
with the means to separate the historical from the theoretical "with vice-like 
firmness'': 
It would be idle to attempt any exposition here of the precise nature of 
Jevons's discoveries; but his disciples may claim that he has given them 
an instrument by which they can hold down any problem of pure 
economics with vice-like firmness, and submit it to a precise and delicate 
treatment hitherto undreamed of, that he has provided them with a 
reagent by which they can precipitate the assumptions that pervade, in 
solution, the works of all the economists, and can separate the theo-
retical from the historical element in their researches, that he has at last 
revealed the true nature of "exchange-value" and its relation to "value in 
use," thereby putting an end to the age-long controversy between 
England and France and bringing the theory of "supply and demand" 
out of the clouds, that he has laid the foundations of the true theory of 
interest, thereby at once confuting the logic and the methods and justi-
fying the aspirations of Mr. Ruskin and the Socialists, and, in a word, that 
he has made one part of economics actually amenable to the methods of 
the exact sciences, and has put it beyond the reach of eloquence or inge-
nuity to make the other parts appear to be (as they are not amenable to 
those methods). 
(Wicksteed 1886: 646) 
Jevons's calls for subdivision of the discipline provided the means by which the 
method of Mill could be preserved in the realm of theory, and with the added 
assertion of universal relevance for the axioms of political economy -
extending even to animals! - theory became somewhat more insulated from 
practice. In contrast with the Historicists, Jevons placed the individual at the 
heart of economic analysis, and he seems to have elevated universally relevant 
and logically precise theory to a status above application. Second,Jevons's calls 
for subdivision allowed for the encouragement of empirical studies as a branch 
of economic studies, thus garnering at least limited support from the 
Historicists such as Leslie and Ingram. Within such specialized empirical 
studies he argued that omitted causes could be presumed to balance, thereby 
further directing attention away from the process of abstraction underlying the 
analysis. To this practice, Mill and Leslie both strenuously objected. Finally, as 
the discipline became more subdivided - and the theory became increasingly 
regarded as universally applicable - the canon became more narrow, more 
rigidly defined, and more unassailable. 
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Notes 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Canon Session of the 1999 HES 
meeting, Greensboro, N.C. I am grateful to David Levy for organizing that session and 
to Evelyn Forget for encouraging me to write the paper.JeffLipkes, Laura Valladadao de 
Mattos, and Larry Moss provided helpful comments. I am also grateful to Dr Peter 
McNiven and Dr Peter Noeckles for their assistance and permission to cite material 
from the Jevons Archives. 
1 A leading proponent of the historical school, the Irish political economist Thomas 
Edward Cliffe Leslie (1825-1882), was Professor of Political Economy and 
Jurisprudence in Queen's College, Belfast, from 1853 until his death. A second major 
proponent whose work proved to be of significant popular appeal was John Kells 
Ingram. Ingram's ([1888] 1967) History of Political Economy went through numerous 
printings and was translated into nine languages. 
2 Mill's method has, of course, been widely and carefully studied (see Blaug 1980, 
DeMarchi 1986, Hausman 1992, Hirsch 1992, Hutchison 1978, Peart 1995). Many 
investigations have focused on the relative roles of deduction and induction in Mill, 
with some analysts arguing that his method was "overly'' deductive, confident, and irre-
sponsible (Hutchison 1978). It is not my purpose here to repeat this well-known 
ground. For a recent detailed demonstration of the importance of experience in Mill's 
method, including several case studies of Mill's practice, see Hollander and Peart 1999. 
On Ireland see "What Is To Be Done With Ireland?" (1848) and "England and 
lreland"(l869), (in Mill 1982, vol. 6: 496-503, 505-32). See also Mill's sympathetic 
review of Leslie's essays, "Leslie on the Land Question" (1870); (Mill 1967, vol. 5: 
669-702). In "England and Ireland," Mill advocates wide-ranging land tenure reform 
transforming tenancy to fixed rents (Mill 1982, vol. 6: 527). 
3 On the substantial identity between Mill andJevons on policy issues, see Peart 1990. 
4 Jevons also used the example of the com laws to make the same argument; cf. Theory 
of Political Economy (Jevons [1871] 1911: 18-19). 
5 I agree with Hausman that in some passages Mill writes as though he considers eco-
nomic reasoning to be an abstraction (and thus hypothetical), while he also on 
occasion refers to economic laws as qualified by ceteris paribus conditions (Hausman 
1992: 33-53; see DeMarchi 1986). 
6 Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind 
are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in which science must 
necessarily proceed. When an effect depends upon a concurrence of causes, 
those causes must be studied one at a time, and their laws separately investi-
gated, if we wish, through the causes, to obtain the power of either predicting 
or controlling the effect; since the law of the effect is compounded of the laws 
of all the causes which determine it. 
(Mill [1836] 1967, vol. 4: 322) 
7 A tendency is "a power acting with a certain intensity in that direction" (Mill [1836] 
1967, vol. 4: 337). 
8 In his Essay, Mill seems to imply that the issue is abstraction, instead of ceteris paribus: 
The conclusions of Political Economy, consequently, like those of geometry, are 
only true, as the common phrase is, in the abstract, that is, they are only true 
under certain suppositions, in which none but general causes- causes common 
to the whok class of cases under consideration - are taken into account. 
(Mill [1836] 1967, vol. 4: 326) 
9 For additional evidence of Mill's modifications to theory based on experiential evi-
dence, see Hollander and Peart 1999. 
10 For an overview of the historical school, see Hutchison 1953. A detailed review of 
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Leslie's ideas is contained in Koot 1975. The prominent economic historian,]. E.T. 
Rogers, is also considered an important influence in the historical school. Since his 
writings are predominantly non-methodological, and since Jevons's responses are 
directed at the work of Ingram and Leslie, I confine my attention to them. Walter 
Bagehot (1826--1877), conservative editor of the Economist and author of Lomhard 
Street, also figured in debates about the generality of the axioms of political economy. 
He took the Millian position that the conclusions of political economy were of lim-
ited relevance, applicable only to countries with institutional structures similar to 
those of England at the time (Bagehot 1876). He was, however, well disposed towards 
Jevons, and wrote a March 10 1866 testimonial in favor of Jevons for the Cobden 
Professorship at Owens College, praising Jevons's "equal knowledge" of "abstract 
theory" and "statistics" (Papers and Correspondence of William Stanley ]evons; Jevons 
1972--81, vol. 3: 114). 
It would be a mistake not to recognize much admiration for J evons - and for Mill 
- among these dissenters, as revealed by their correspondence as well as published 
remarks. Leslie considered himself a follower of Mill and theirs is a correspondence 
that reflects much warmth. See Mill's review of Leslie's essays on Ireland, referred to 
in note 2. See the letter from Ingram to Jevons dated January 21 1881 Gevons 
1972--81, vol. 5: 124--5), in which Ingram acknowledged with great pleasureJevons's 
recognition of his BAAS Address in the second edition of the Theory. See also Leslie's 
warm letter to Jevons of 28 August 1878, alluding to the Address by Ingram (Jevons 
1972--81, vol. 4: 272-3). 
11 Though some common ground is necessary given the intermixture of the issues in 
the original debates, this investigation confines itself to the theory/practice debates. 
For a detailed examination of the separation of economics from social phenomena, 
see Peart 1999. 
12 Ingram's Address received wide press. A detailed summary appeared in The Times 
(August 1 7, p. I 0). A leader on the Address appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette (August 
22 1878). See Leslie's August 28 letter to Jevons, Gevons 1972--81, vol. 5: 2-3). 
13 The significance of such a combination had been revealed in the study of economic 
fluctuations: 
A theory of decennial recurrence of commercial crises, for example, was based 
on the occurrence of crises in 1837, 1847, and 1857. Had the causes of com-
mercial crises been examined, it would have been discovered that they are 
extremely various and uncertain in their occurrence; that a war, a bad harvest, 
a drain of the precious metals, anything, in short, which produces a panic, may 
cause a crisis; and as there is no decennial periodicity in the causes, there can 
be none in the effects. 
(Leslie 1873a: 377) 
14 Bonamy Price (1807-1888) succeeded Thorold Rogers as Drummand Professor of 
Political Economy at Oxford in 1868, a position he held until his death. Price acknowl-
edged but downplayed the significance of achievements by]. E. Caimes as well as 
Jevons: "they have remoulded, rather than added to, our economical knowledge, and 
remoulded it in a way rather tentative than final or satisfuctory'' (Price 1879: 183). 
15 No one, whether agreeing or not, can fail to feel the force, the energy, the 
extent of knowledge, which distinguish his chapters on peasant proprietors, on 
co-operation, on the future of the labouring classes. But from these perfectly 
natural and practical disquisitions he is perpetually being recalled by the artifi-
cial sense that he is writing a scientific work. He elaborates the simplest 
propositions, and puts them in technical form. Sometimes, after a series of 
complex and cumbrous reasonings, he emerges on a conclusion perfectly 
naive in its simplicity. 
(Price 1879: 198) 
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16 Jevons's comment about first principles is, however, a statement about the average: 
he allowed that individuals make mistakes, but he believed that such mistakes cancel 
out over time or over a wide group of consumers. See Peart 1996 and, for the simi-
larity with Menger in this respect, Peart 1998. 
"M. de Laveleye and Professor Leslie may succeed in constituting a new science, 
but they will not utterly revolutionise and destroy the old one in the way they seem 
to suppose" (Jevons [1905] 1965: 197). The Belgian political economist Emile Louis 
Victor de Laveleye (1822-1892) was a supporter of the historical school and 
• Professor of Political Economy at Liege, from 1864-92. • 
17 Maas 1998 maintains thatJevons's abacus helped him conceive of economic man as 
similar to a machine. 
18 In support of his calls for subdivision,Jevons invoked the division oflabor principle. 
19 [T] he theory of economy ... will naturally be one science, remaining the same 
throughout its applications, though it may be broken up into several parts, the 
theories of utility, of exchange, of labour, of interest, etc. partly corresponding 
to the old division of the science into the laws of consumption, exchange, dis-
tribution, production, and so forth 
(Jevons [1905] 1965: 200) 
Jevons insisted, of course, that this "general science" or "theory" of economics, was 
mathematical. See Schabas 1990. 
20 "[T] he political economist is expected to teach all parts of his equally extensive and 
growing science, and is lucky if he escape having to profess also the mental, meta-
physical, and moral sciences generally'' (Jevons [1905] 1965: 201). 
21 He alluded also in this context to Ingram's BAAS Address, as well as - to a "lesser 
extent" - the work of Thornton. It is important to bear in mind the theoretical 
debates that occurred throughout this time, and which are linked to the method-
ological disputes as well: Ricardian wage and distribution theory was being attacked 
throughout the decade by Historicists (see Leslie 1879b: 160), and, though along 
other lines, by Jevons as well. 
22 Jevons makes a similar argument in the Lecture: 
Now I am far from thinking that the historical treatment of our science is false 
or useless. On the contrary, I consider it to be indispensaple. The present eco-
nomical state of society cannot possibly be explained by theory alone. We must 
take into account the long past out of which we are constantly emerging. 
Whether we call it sociology or not, we must have some scientific treatment of 
the principles of evolution as manifested in every branch of social existence .... 
every law, custom, or social fact is the product of the past, historical or forgotten. 
(Jevons [1905]1965: 195) 
23 See the obituary notice in the Royal Society, signed R H.: 
Problems in applied economics had for Jevons a peculiar attractiveness, 
because of their bearing on the material welfare of the community. His devo-
tion to abstract studies did not destroy his interest in the progress of society, or 
in questions touching the practical life of men. While busied with researches 
on abstract principles, he always kept a window open to the outer world. 
(Proceedings of the Royal Society 1883: vii-viii) 
24 Not surprisingly, Jevons's calls for the use of statistical studies found support in the 
Manchester Statistical Society, where, in 1871, then President and influential 
Manchester banker John Mills recognizedJevons's remarkable gold studies, "a beau-
tiful typical illustration of the use of hypothesis in this class of enquiries, [that] may 
suffice to show the mode in which theoretical Political Economy and Statistics co-
operate and render a reciprocal service" (Mills 1871: 8) 
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25 The obituary in Nature points to Jevons's caution in this regard: 
He was too far-seeing and too judicious to overlook the enormous gulf that sep-
arates abstract economics from the domain of practice, and he was under no 
delusion as to the practicability of applying exact methods to phenomena so 
immensely complex as those of society 
(Nature 1882: 420) . 
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